Abstract-Recent developments in cloud storage architectures have originated new models of online storage as cooperative storage systems and interconnected clouds. Such distributed environments involve many organizations, thus ensuring confidentiality becomes crucial: only legitimate clients should recover the information they distribute among storage nodes.
I. MOTIVATION
Recently, the spreading of online storage services (such as iCloud, Dropbox, Skydrive, etc.) has seen a huge increase. According to the classical paradigm, the service provider buys or rents a large number of servers in which authorized clients are able to store their data. Recently, two other paradigms have emerged, viz. cooperative storage services (CSS) and federated (storage) clouds (FC).
In CSS, the storage capacity is provided directly by the clients themselves who, co-operating in the cloud, make their own storage facilities available to the others. This approach offers some evident advantages: first of all the service provider only needs a small number of servers, acting as coordinators for the access to the service. Secondly, increasing the number of users yields an increase of the storage capabilities. In this context, data is stored by the users, each acting as a storage server. In FC, organizations decide to agree on sharing their resources for solving common tasks. In this scenario, data is read from (and written to) several storage providers, each managing its set of storage servers behinds its cloud.
A fundamental requirement of CSS and FC is confidentiality: only the legitimate client should be able to recover the original information.
A consolidated solution to achieve confidentiality in such contexts is based on data dispersal. Dispersal algorithms provide a methodology for storing information in n distinct pieces, or slices, (dispersed) across multiple locations, so that redundancy protects the information in the event of a location outage, but unauthorized access at any single location does not provide usable information. Only the originator or a user which has access to, at least, k out of the n slices distributed among m available servers (or providers) can properly assemble and recover the complete information, without the need of any preshared encryption key. Instead, a client or attacker retrieving a number of slices lower than k is not able to get any information. This basic principle has been applied since the pioneer works by Shamir [1] and Rabin [2] , and subsequently confirmed by McEliece and Sarwate [3] who disclosed the relationship with Reed-Solomon (RS) coding schemes.
Dispersal algorithms based on RS schemes have optimal performances, but they are subject to constraints due to the algebraic nature of the codes which practically limit the number of servers m, i.e., the level of dispersion. Since a large number of servers is convenient both from the client point of view (which can tolerate a greater number of failures) and from the security point of view (since the attacker needs to crack a larger number of nodes to steal the data), new solutions based on the Luby transform (LT) codes for the dispersal algorithm have been proposed [4] . These codes have no limit, in principle, on the value of n. On the other side, a characteristic feature of LT is that there are two thresholds k 1 and k 2 such that if an attacker has access to at least k 1 slices it has some probability of reconstructing the entire message, while if it has access to at least k 2 slices it has all the needed information to reconstruct the message. For this reason, one can see the RS coding schemes as special cases of LT.
Both coding schemes, RS and LT, can be combined with an all-or-nothing-transform (AONT) [5] realising AONT-RS and AONT-LT [6] data dispersal algorithms.
In this work we provide a unified formal framework to model check the mentioned dispersal algorithms against different kinds of attackers trying to intercept slices and reconstruct the original message. We use the tool PRISM [7] to verify the degree of confidentiality of such algorithms. Since the problem is intrinsically parametric, we also want to identify suitable conditions under which the verification outcome holds for any number of storage providers in the cloud. To this aim, we repeatedly measured the probability of a confidentiality attack to understand how it varies w.r.t. other parameters, and in particular when the number of slices n increases.
Two different types of intruder are analyzed: the first one can eavesdrop the slices traveling to a server without interfering with the communication. The second type of intruder can violate some providers and retrieve all the slices they store. Both intruders are assumed to be passive and probabilistic, meaning that they can only read the exchanged information, and probabilities affect their capability of taking any action.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section II defines the modeling languages and the models used for our analysis; Section III shows the formal analysis allowing us to measure the probability of an attack; Section IV comments the experimental data; Section V compares our work with the existing literature, while Section VI summarizes our results. 1 
II. MODELING
Here, we formally describe a client process and two types of intruder. The main client responsibility is sending a sequence of slices to several distinct storage servers, following the specific dispersal algorithm. The set of slices constitutes the message. A message includes an actual content, viz. message body, and some extra information, viz. message payload, containing, among other things, the replicated information allowing to reconstruct the message body even in presence of faulty storage nodes. The main responsibility for both types of intruder is to intercept the traveling slices, and reconstruct the message body. The key difference between them is that the first type intercepts every slice independently from the previous ones. The second type of intruder, on the other side, attacks the storage providers and collect all the stored slices. The actions of the intruders are probabilistic.
The following parameters affect the system behavior: n is the number of slices that compose the message, m is the number of storage providers (or servers) in the system, c is the number of slices every server/provider can store, also called capacity, k 1 and k 2 are two thresholds such that if the attacker intercepts at least k 1 slices it has some probability of reconstructing the entire message body, while if it intercepts at least k 2 slices it has all the necessary information to reconstruct the message body. Two series of probabilities are used: a i is the probability of intercepting a slice traveling to storage provider i, for the first attacker, and it is the probability of attacking the storage provider i, for the second attacker; x j is the probability of reconstructing the entire message body, given j slices have been intercepted by the attacker. The relation among parameters are the following:
1 The detailed proofs of can be found in the extended version [8] .
A. The system Markov Decision Processes, or MDP for short, is a formalism allowing the definition of systems with probabilistic and non-deterministic actions. They are thus recognized as a good means to model randomized distributed systems: each process is described by its probabilistic transition function, and processes are interleaved by a non-deterministic scheduler . We briefly introduce MDPs using Baier and Katoen's notation [9] . 
AP is a labeling function.
We write (s, α, p, s ) ∈ P r whenever P r(s, α, s ) = p, for some suitable states s, s , action α and probability p > 0. We call transition any such tuple.
If the MDP is in state s, an action α is enabled if (s, α, p, s ) ∈ P r, for some state s and probability p. If an action α is enabled, than the probabilities among α-transitions must form a probability distribution: s ∈S P r(s, α, s ) = 1. More than one action can be enabled in the same state s, thus the sum of probabilities of all transitions leaving state s sum up to the number of enabled actions. Let us remark that while probabilities in MDP could be real values, for algorithmic purposes in this work we constrain them to be rational values.
In the following we make use of the uniform probability
We write states of MDPs as configurations of some given set of variables V . Given a state s and a variable v ∈ V , we write s.v to denote the value of the variable in that state. Given two states s and s and a set of variables V , we write s ≡ V s meaning that the values of variables in V are the same in both states:
Given MDPs M 1 and M 2 , we will denote with M 1 M 2 the MDP resulting from their synchronous composition.
Let us list the graphical conventions used in this work to depict MDPs (see Fig. 1 and following): . . . PRISM notation, the boolean formula on a transition can refer to variables in the source state by their name (e.g. ctr c ), and to variables in the target state by their primed name (e.g. ctr c ).
B. The client
Let CLIENT be the MDP encoding the client process described earlier (see Fig. 1 ). It has the following local variables:
• pc c : track the progress of the process, The MDP has a first block of m transitions from pc c = 0 to pc c = 1 picking a storage server (or provider) to store the slice; each transition is subject to some probability p i . Next, the client either sends the slice to the selected recipient, if the latter has not reached its capacity, or it tries again picking another one. A total slice counter and a server/provider slice counter are increased whenever the slice is sent. The loop terminates when all the slices are sent.
Let us remark that the sending transition is labeled with a special action busy. This is used when building the synchronous composition of CLIENT with the MDP modeling the intruder, to synchronize the action of sending by the client and the action of intercepting by the intruder.
C. The slice attacker
Let us name SLICEATT the MDP encoding the first type of intruder. The reason for its name is that it tries to intercept every slice, independently from the previously intercepted ones. The intruder is given in Fig. 2 . It has two local variables, viz. pc a and ctr a . The former tracks the progress of the attack, while the latter counts the number of intercepted slices at any given moment.
The figure shows that the attack progresses linearly: it starts by intercepting the first k 1 slices, each with probability a i given that the slice is sent to server/provider i. Having intercepted less than k 1 slices, there is no possibility to reconstruct the message body. After intercepting k 1 slices the next chain of states repeatedly alternate these steps: first it tries to reconstruct the message body with probability x j , given j = ctr a ; if it fails it tries to intercept a new slice. The state pc a = done denotes that the intruder reconstructed the message body.
D. The provider attacker
Let PROVIDERATT be the MDP encoding the second type of intruder. The reason for its name is that it tries to obtain the credentials of the storage provider, and later it will intercept all the slices traveling towards that provider.
The intruder is depicted in Fig. 3 . It has two local variables, viz. pc a and ctr a . Similarly to the previous intruder, the former variable models the progress of the attack, while the latter counts the number of intercepted slices.
The intruder has an initial chain of m states where it tries to attack every provider tossing a coin with probability a i ; if the attack is successful it sets a flag att i a for provider i. State pc a = m is reached when all attack attempts are decided (some succeeded and some failed). In a loop the attacker synchronizes with the busy action from the client that is sending a message, to intercept every slice sent to an attacked provider. From state (pc a = m, ctr a = j) there is a transition to some state with pc = done labeled with probability x j , meaning that it has probability x j to reconstruct the content of the message, given j intercepted slices.
III. PARAMETRIC FORMAL VERIFICATION
In Section II we have seen that the problem at our hands is intrinsically parametric. The model checking problem requires its input MDP to be finite, thus we must fix the system parameters. On the other hand, this means that the outcome of our formal verification holds only for the specific configuration of the parameters themselves. One of the common desiderata when doing parametric formal verification, is to prove universal properties, i.e. we should check whether some property holds for any configuration of parameters. In this work we are able to measure the confidentiality of dispersal algorithms for any number of storage providers in presence of a slice attacker, while in the case of the provider attacker the degree of confidentiality depends on the actual number of storage providers in the network. Before showing the detailed formal analysis, we report the needed formal ingredients.
A. Preliminaries
PCTL is a temporal logic for describing qualitative and quantitative aspects of probabilistic systems. The grammar of PCTL formulae is the following:
where p ∈ AP and J ⊆ [0, 1] is a rational interval. Terms of Φ are state formulae, while terms of ϕ are path formulae.
A thorough description of the logic satisfiability relation is beyond the aims of this paper, since the subject is covered by Given a PCTL path formula ϕ and an MDP M, there exist polynomial time algorithms computing the minimum and maximum probabilities of ϕ w.r.t. all the initial states of M [9, Ch. 10.6] . In the following we will write P min (ϕ, M) and P max (ϕ, M) to denote such computed probabilities. 2 From the definitions of M |= Φ, P min and P max , the following fact holds immediately. 
We can measure the likelihood of breaking 2 Note that, in general, given any PCTL formula ϕ and MDP M, it is possible that P min (ϕ, M) = Pmax(ϕ, M). This is a consequence of the sequence of non-deterministic choices that can be taken in the executions of M, each leading to a (possibly) different probability outcome associated to ϕ. This motivates the interest in discovering the minimum and maximum probabilities with which ϕ holds in M.
the confidentiality requirement of M 1 (resp. M 2 ) computing P min (F (HACKED), M 1 ) and P max (F (HACKED), M 1 ) (resp. P min (F (HACKED), M 2 ) and P max (F (HACKED), M 2 )).
Due to Proposition 1, the probabilistic model checking problem may assume two different flavours:
• qualitative: take as input an MDP M and a formula Φ, and return true iff M |= Φ; • quantitative: take as input an MDP M and a path formula ϕ, and compute P min and P max .
Here we use the quantitative probabilistic model checking. Given an MDP M, one can show that two states s and s are indistinguishable, from a probabilistic point of view, if (i) every step taken from s is mimicked by some step taken from s , (ii) both steps end in equivalent states, and (iii) the viceversa is also true. This is captured by the notion of probabilistic bisimulation.
Definition 2 (Probabilistic Bisimulation, [9, Ex. 10.27]).

Given an MDP (S, Act, P r, ι, L), a probabilistic bisimulation is an equivalence relation R ⊆ S × S such that, for any s, s ∈ S, R(s, s ) iff:
• L(s) = L(s ), and • P r(s, α, X) = P r(s , α, X), ∀α ∈ Act, X ∈ S /R where S /R represents the quotient set of S by R. 
Given two states s, t, let us write s ≈ R t if R(s, t)
(ϕ, M 1 ) = P min (ϕ, M 2 ) and P max (ϕ, M 1 ) = P max (ϕ, M 2 ).
B. Parameter abstraction for the slice attacker
Let us consider the MDP M slice = CLIENT SLICEATT. In order to generalize our verification for any number of storage servers, we group the latter in channels, i.e. collections of servers that are indistinguishable.
Formally we define a channel as a triple (x, g, a) where x ∈ N >0 is the number of servers in the channel, g : [1, x] → [0, 1] is a probability distribution and a ∈ [0, 1] is a probability value. Intuitively, x is the number of storage servers belonging to the channel, g is the probability distribution of picking any server in the channel when sending a slice, conditioned by the fact that the current channel has been chosen, and a is the probability of attacking any server belonging to the channel. It is easy to see that if a channel has size one, it can only be defined as follows: (1, 1 , a) , for some a ∈ [0, 1].
In this analysis we assume that any storage server can host any number of slices. We also fix a subset of the model variables:
Given an Markov Decision Process M, let us write M f ((x 1 , g 1 , a 1 ) , . . . , (x k , g k , a k )) denoting a copy of it where storage servers are grouped in the given k channels. Our claim is that if we check formulae that look only at variables in V (and in particular that do not look at variables s c and ctr
, then a system with one server per channel is indistinguishable from a system with an arbitrary number of servers per channel. This means that the number of channels in the system defines an upper limit, or cutoff, to the size of the model to be verified. 1 , a 1 ), . . . , (1, 1 , a k ) ) and M 2 = M slice f ((n 1 , g 1 , a 1 ), . . . , (n k , g k , a k ) ). Let L 1 and L 2 be the respective labeling functions, and assume they are invariant with respect to V . Then:
Theorem 2. Fix a positive number k and any probability distribution
Next corollary follows from Theorem 2 and Theorem 1. 
C. Variable abstraction for the provider attacker
Here we focus on the scenario in which the intruder can break one or more providers, thus accessing all the slices they store. Two applicative examples of this scenario are the cooperative storage systems, where each node joining the network can receive some of the slices, and the interconnected cloud, where a client may decide to split the message among several cloud storage providers. In the latter case we ignore the fact the cloud storage provider may further distribute the received slices among its own servers, and treat each such provider as a single server.
The model checking problem: P min (ϕ, CLIENT PROVIDERATT), where ϕ encodes our confidentiality requirements, remains a problem parameterized by the actual numbers of storage providers (similarly for P max ).
On the other side, one can easily see that if every provider can host any number of slices (i.e. c ≥ n) we can produce an indistinguishable model that is much smaller w.r.t. the original one, by simply dropping the variables W = {ctr Name CLIENT a copy of CLIENT whose state does not contain variables in W . Intuitively, this means that CLIENT does not check whether a provider reached its capacity, but this is not a limitation since we assumed that every storage provider can host any number of slices. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS
Here we show how to use model checking for measuring the likelihood of breaking the confidentiality requirement against systems of growing sizes. In particular the parameter n is increased among runs. We remark that any cloud system is characterized by its own sets of parameters (e.g. the probabilities of attacking the used providers may be part of their SLA). In our experiments we choose parameters arbitrarily, mainly for showing the feasibility of the approach and underlining the weakness of data dispersal algorithms in some cloud environment , viz. interconnected clouds. The checked specifications are taken from Example 1.
Thanks to the parametric abstractions explained in Section III, the verification outcomes using the intruder SLICEATT hold no matter the number of storage servers/providers in the system. In the case of intruder PROVIDERATT the results depend on the number of storage providers in the network.
The experiments were run on a machine Xeon Quad Core 2.3 Ghz with 8 GB RAM and Linux 2.6.32 64 bit. The points in the graphs correspond to distinct instances of the model checking problem, all requiring from few seconds to 60 minutes to complete.
In the first set of experiments we compare two different types of dispersal algorithms, those based on RS transforms against those based on LT transforms. For this analysis we fixed the number of channels/providers to 3 and the attacking probabilities to a 1 = 0.1, a 2 = 0.2, and a 3 = 0.3. In the RS case we assumed k 1 = k 2 = 0.7 · n, while in the LT case we assumed k 1 = 0.6 · n and k 2 = 0.8 · n. In the case of the LT transforms we assumed that the sequence of probabilities
and then stabilize at 1 for values greater than or equal to k 2 .
In Fig. 4 and 5 we depict how the probability of breaking the confidentiality requirement varies w.r.t. n. Let us remark that P max and P min versions of the formula coincide in every point of the series. We also notice that the algorithm (under the given parameters) shows a high degree of confidentiality against SLICEATT, while it is sensibly less confidential against PROVIDERATT. Moreover, the confidentiality in the latter case, after some initial change, stabilizes and does not depend on the actual number of exchanged slices. The latter observation is not surprising since the intruder mainly attacks providers, and few providers will receive many slices, thus giving the intruder a high probability of guessing the message body.
The second block of experimental data compares the effect of different attack probabilities, viz. a 1 = 0.1, a 2 = 0.2, and a 3 = 0.3 (see Low) vs. a 1 = 0.3, a 2 = 0.4, and a 3 = 0.5 (see High). For this analysis we used only LT transforms and we fixed the number of channels/providers to 3. As before, k 1 = 0.6 · n and k 2 = 0.8 · n and the series x j grows linearly as for the previous experiment. Fig. 6 and 7 summarize the model checking outcomes. As would be expected, higher probabilities of intercepting slices give the data dispersal algorithm a very low level of confidentiality against intruder SLICEATT. Again, the low number of providers causes a low degree of confidentiality against intruder PROVIDERATT.
Finally, a third set of experiments compares the effects of different numbers of channels/providers in the system and the results are given in Fig. 8 and 9 . In both cases a LT transform was used, with k 1 = 0.6 · n and k 2 = 0.8 · n. In one case we assumed 5 channels/providers in the network (see m5) and in the other 10 channels/providers (see m10). The probabilities a i , for i ∈ [1, m] , are distributed uniformly in the interval [0, 0.25] in both cases. x j is defined as for the previous experiment. Once again the degree of confidentiality against PROVIDERATT is considerably lower than that against SLICEATT. We underline that the experiment with 10 providers could be verified only for a small number of slices (n ≤ 150), before running out of memory. Even though this fact represents a scalability issue of the presented methodology, the verification outcomes are still of practical interest since interconnected (or federated) cloud solutions usually employ a limited number of storage providers. Confidentiality of data dispersal with a small number of storage nodes appears to be too weak against attacks directed to the storage provider.
V. RELATED WORK
Formal verification of security requirements has a long history. In this area, model checking plays a predominant role [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] . The traditional approaches consist in model checking the security requirements of a system opposed to an adversary able to intercept, remove, modify the original messages as well as to inject new messages. In this respect, the Dolev-Yao intruder model [14] is considered the most general model (the worst case) [15] as it assumes a non-deterministic attacker in full control of the communication channels.
Traditional model checking, though, is not suitable for verifying security of cloud systems: it can only verify whether a system can be attacked or not. We assume, instead, that every component of a cloud system can be attacked with some degree of probability, and are more interested in measuring the likelihood of such attacks. This motivated us to define custom probabilistic intruder models, in place of the DolevYao intruder. To the best of our knowledge, few authors used probabilistic model checking for measuring security of systems [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] .
It is well known that model checking techniques must face the state-explosion problem, that easily makes the verification of real-world protocols and systems unfeasible. To overcome this limitation, one looks for abstraction techniques [20] that reduce the description of the system to a feasible statespace, still preserving the relevant properties. Special forms of abstractions are required when the system state-space depends on given parameters and one wants to check whether some property holds for all values of such parameters [21] , [22] .
With regards to probabilistic models, several approaches use abstraction techniques. Legay et al. [23] and Nouri et al. [24] , for example, collect traces of real or simulated systems. Next they sample them in order to build an MDP that abstracts the original system. Such technique avoids to build a complete analysis of all the traces for large-scale (or even infinite) systems. The larger is the sample, on the other side, the higher is the probability that the verification outcomes are correct. Herd et al. [25] , instead, proposed a trace sampling technique combined with trace fragmentation, i.e. only few fragments of a trace are considered. Abate et al. [26] proposed a method for transforming an MDP with an uncountable number of states into a Markov chain by means of a quotient-set based abstraction. The paper proves that the produced Markov chain approximates a probabilistic bisimulation of the original MDP. Finally, let us remark that also the structure of the attacker may determine the feasibility of the verification of security properties. In our work we employed a passive intruder model, and indeed several authors agree that this is enough when analyzing confidentiality requirements. For example, Li and Pang [27] , and Shmatikov [16] used passive intruders to verify anonymity of protocols, a special case of confidentiality. The latter work also considers probabilistic attacks. As far as we know, the use of a probabilistic passive attacker model for the analysis of data confidentiality is original.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a unified framework for the probabilistic model checking of a broad class of data dispersal algorithms in interconnected or cooperative cloud storage systems.
We verified confidentiality requirements of dispersal algorithms, checking the likelihood that an intruder has of intercepting slices of information and reconstruct the information.
In our framework we defined two types of probabilistic intruder, one tries to intercept each slice independently and the other attempts to attack the storage provider. In the former case the attack surface is the set of slices while in the latter it is the set of providers.
The problem is inherently parametric, since the CPU time and memory required to complete the verification are highly affected by several parameters, e.g. the number of slices used to split the information and the number of servers/providers.
By proving a probabilistic bisimulation property, we were able to generalize the results of the verification of confidentiality against the slice attacker to any number of servers in the network. The key observation, codified in our channel abstraction, is that any group of servers sharing the same probability of being eavesdropped may form a channel and behave like a single server hosting all the slices.
The analysis of the confidentiality against the provider attacker suggests, on the contrary, that classic data dispersal algorithms may not be the best solution to ensure confidentiality in interconnected cloud environments, unless the number of storage providers is considerably high.
We should remark that the conducted experiments fix some parameters to specific values. The conclusions thus are not fully generalizable w.r.t. such parameters. Among the modifiable parameters we remark that only k 1 and k 2 affect the state space and thus the complexity of the model checking problem.
We leave as future research the investigation of better abstractions suitable for the verification of the confidentiality of data dispersal algorithms against PROVIDERATT on networks with many storage providers. That would improve the scalability of our framework to handle the case of cooperative storage systems.
